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him a party. Plaintiff having those rights, the master cannot
be prejudiced by their exercise except in the situation where
there might be inconsistent judgments; that is, a judgment
against the master but in favor of the servant where the issue
is one that necessarily affects the master's vicarious liability.
In the instant case if there had been no dismissal of the action
against the servant the retrial of the action against him might
have resulted in a judgment favorable to him and hence in(;onsistent with the judgment against the master, but that will
not happen because the action against the servant will not be
retried. It is dismissed. How can it be said that the master
is entitled to the benefit of the new trial granted as to the
servant when because of the dismissal there will be no retrial
as to the servant 1 Indeed it is immaterial whether the order
for a new trial was based upon some ground affecting the
master's liability. The effect of the dismissal is to wipe the
cause of action' against the servant from the record. The
proceeding is back in the same condition it would have been
if plaintiff had sued the master alone.
But if we assume that the master is entitled to the benefit
of the order granting a new trial as to the servant, certainly
it must first be determined that that order was based upon a
ground which affects both the master and servant. The order
was made on all of the grounds provided by statute except
insufficiency of the evidence. The precise ground does not
appear. If it is supportable on any ground it must be
assumed that the court granted the servant's motion on some
ground that did not affect the master's liability. Otherwise
the denial of the master's motion for a new trial would be
error. A trial court is not presumed to act erroneously. Ou
the contrary all presumptions are in favor of the correctness
of its action. Hence, if there is any error for which the servant's motion for a new trial could be granted without affecting the master, that ground must be presumed to be the one
relied upon. I suggest two such grounds. There may be
more. There may have been misconduct on the part of plaintiff's counsel such as suggesting that the servant was insured
or was a wealthy man well able to pay any verdict rendered
against him. Neither of those statements would prejudice
the master or be error as to him. Yet they would entitle the
servant to a new trial. The record does not show that such
misconduct occurred but neither does it show it did not occur,
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It does not contain the arguments to the juri: We should
presume that the trial court acted correctly and therefore
that such error existed in the absence of anything in the rec.
ord to the contrary.
Furthermore, the majority opinion, by the process of elimination, determines that the motion for a new trial as to the'
servant must have been granted upon the ground of excessive
damages. If such was the case, then a new trial should be
ordered on the issue of damages only instead of requiring
the plaintiff to establish again all of the other issues in the
case.
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed.

[So F. No. 16840. In Bank.

Aug. 18, 1944.]

MATSON TERMINALS, INC. (a Corporation) et at, Petitioners, V. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents; FRANK ABELLEIRA et at,
Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.Unemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1 (Stats. 1941, p. 2535;
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp., Act 8780d), which simply
makes it unnecessary to file a protest as a condition to contesting items charged to the employer's account and suing
for the recovery of allegedly excessive contributions, and
which provides for supplying him information on which to
base his contest, cannot operate, any more than the provision
for court review in § 45.10, to deprive the court of power to
review a decision of the Employment Commission awarding
unemployment benefits alleged to be in violation of the act.
[2] Id. - Remedies of Employer - Administrative and Judicial
Remedies. - Although Unemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1,
provides for an administrative determination of the correctness of the charges affecting an employer's merit rating and
for recovery of overpayments, this remedy, likE' that afforded
by § 45.10, is distinct from that provided by § 67 to test the
propriety of the payment of benefits. An employer whose re[1] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SuPp. (Pocket Part), "Unemployment Reserves and Social Security."
McK.
Reference: [1-9] Unemployment Relief.
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serve account may be affected by such payment to any individual formerly in his employ is a party "beneficially interested" in the administrative proceeding to determine the award
of benefits, and retains this status for the purpose of testing
before a court of law the legality of the Employment Commission's final decision.
[3] Id.-Remedies of Employer-Judicial Remedies-Finality of
Determination.-Uliemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1 was not
intended to afford the employer an opportunity .to relitigate
the propriety of an award of benefits. Since he may raise
objections to the award in proceedings under §§ 67 and 72,
the decision in such proceedings will finally determine the
propriety of the payments, thus precluding objections by him
to charges based on the claimants' ineligibility for benefits
in later proceedings to which they are not parties.
[4] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute.-Under Employment Insurance Act, § 56(a), providing
that an individual is not eligible for unemployment benefits
if he leaves his work because of a trade dispute, longshoremen who voluntarily refused to cross the picket lines established at their employers' waterfront docks by striking ship
clerks were not entitled to benefits.
[5a, 5b] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade
Dispute.-In enacting Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a),
providing that a claimant is ineligible for benefits while "he
continues out of work by reason of the fact that the trade
dispute is still in active progress in the establishment in which
he was employed," the Legislature did not intend that the
disqualification should turn on whether the claimant had entered a legal relationship of employer and employee at the
precise moment that the trade dispute arose, as there is no
generally accepted test for determining at a particular moment
whether a person is "employed," and as the act establishes
a policy of neutrality by provisions that payment or withholding of benefits should not be used to aid either party to
a labor dispute.

association, and to which he has an exclusive right, is ''his
work" within Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a).
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[6] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Disputo.-Where a registered longshoreman does not work regularly for the same employer at the same place of business,
but under a contract between his union and an employers'
association works under an arrangement that assures him his
proportionate share of the work on a waterfront, and where
ho, in his turn, ia dispatched to the various dooks at whioh
his services fl.re required, the longshore work that he regularly performs for the various members of the employers'

[24 C 2d 695)

[7] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute.-The word "establishment" in Unemployment Insurance
Act, § 56(a), as applied with reference to registered longshoremen who under a contract are assigned through a hiring
hall to all the work of all the employers of an employers'
association, means the various waterfront dock;s covered by
the contract and at which longshoremen customarily work;
and where this is the area covered by a ship clerks' strike,
longshoremen who refuse to cross the strikers' picket lines
are not eligible for unemployment benefits.
[8] ld.-Conclusiveness of Referee's A:fII.rmance of· Allowance of
Benefits.-Employees who left the4' work because of a trade
dispute are not entitled to payments of unemployment benefits
on affirmance of an allowance of such benefits to them by a
referee pursuant to Unemployment Insurance Act, § 67, regardless of whether the award was right or wrong, where the
Employment Commission vacated the referee's decision and
transferred the matter to itself for determination, and where
the Supreme Court has decided finally that the employees
are not entitled to the payments.
.
[9] ld.-Conclusiveness of Referee's Affirmance of. Allowance of
Benefits.-Unemployment Insurance Act, § 67, providing that
if a referee affirms an initial allowance of benefits they shall
be paid regardless of any appeal that thereafter may be
taken, merely prevents a stay of payments; it does not create
a substantive right. If by a decision of the Employment Commission on appeal or by a court on review the· payments are
found to be unauthorized and illegal, said seetion does not
make them valid.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California
Employment Commission to vacate an order awarding unemployment benefits. Writ granted.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Gregory A. Harrison, M. B.
Plant and Richard Ernst for Petitioners.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John J. Dailey,Deputy Attorney General, Maurice P. McCaffrey, Ralph R. Planteen, Charles P. Soully, Forrest M. Hill, Leonard M. Friedman, Gladstein, Grossman,
Margolis & Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Glad-
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stein, Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and
Richard Gladstein for Respondents.
TRA YNOR, J.-The petitioners, a number of steamship
and stevedoring companies that are employers within the
meaning of the California Unemployment Insurance Act
(Stats. 1935, ch. 352, .as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
8780d), seek a writ of mandamus to prevent enforcement
of an order of the California Employment Commission awarding unemployment insurance benefits to a group of longshoremen, interveners herein.
The petitioners operate pier and terminal facilities in
the San Francisco Bay area and are associated together in
an incorporated, nonprofit, association, the Waterfront Employers' Association of San Francisco, which acts as intermediary between them and their employees, represents them
in collective bargaining and in the operation and maintenance
of a hiring hall, compiles statistical information, and serves as
a central clearing office of records of hours and wages of the
longshoremen. It is also the agent of the employers in computing the contributions and making the reports required by
the Unemployment Insurance Act. The association does not
handle cargoes or operate ships or terminal facilities, or otherwise engage in the business of shipping or stevedoring.
The companies constituting its membership are separate businesses, each with its own organization and personnel. The
association does not include certain private companies operating pier and terminal facilities, the United States Army
Transport Service, which owns and operates its Own pier
facilities on a military reservation, or the Port of Oakland,
which owns and operates docks at Oakland. The longshoremen who are claimants in the present proceeding work intermittently at various places for various employers.
The method of hiring longshoremen prescribed by the MIlective bargaining agreement between the association and
Local 1-10 of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, District No.1, was adopted after their
strike in 1934, with the object of improving the distribution
of employment. It seeks to make work opportunities available to all longshoremen equally by dispatching them in rotation to jobs. Instead of reporting to the docks operated by
each company, they report to a hiring hall jointly maintained
and operated by the employers' association and the long-
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shoremen's union through a Labor Relations Committee composed of three employer and three union representatives.
Employers place their requests with the dispatcher at the
hiring hall, who is selected by the union but is an employee
of the Joint Labor Relations Committee. In dispatching men
for work, preference is given to registered longshoremen, and
no one else may be employed while anyone on the list of registered longshoremen is qualified, ready, and willing to work.
rfhe Labor Relations Committee alone has the power to add
names to the list or remove them. It may also issue permits
allowing their holders to work if no registered longshoremen
are available, and some of the claimants herein are such "permit men." When men dispatched from the hiring hall report
at a particular dock and are there dismissed without work,
the company operating the dock must pay them two hours'
"stand-by" compensation. At present the employers' association maintains a central office to which each employer forwards his payments and where the worker receives all the
checks due him, but this proceeding relates to a time when the
men received their checks by calling at the offices of the vari.
ous companies for which they had worked during the week.
The employers who are petitioners herein employ dock
checkers, who. keep records of the cargo loaded or discharged
lor the employers, and who belong to the Ship Clerks' Union,
a local union affiliated with the same international as the
longshoremen's union. For the purpose of bargaining collectively with the Ship Clerks' Union, the employers belonged
to the Dock Checkers Employers' Association of San Francisco. As a result of a dispute between the two, the Ship
Clerks' Union called a strike on November 10, 1939, effective
at 6 :00 p. m., against employers who were members of the
Dock Checkers Employers' Association. The strike continued
until January 3, 1940. Members of the longshoremen's union
did not work for these employers during this period but filed
claims with the California Employment Commission for unemployment insurance benefits relating to this period.
When the strike began, some claimants were working upon
unfinished jobs for employers against whom the strike was
declared; others were at the hiring hall awaiting their next
assignment; others who were working for employers not involved in the dispute did not stop work until their job assignments were completed.
The adjustment unit of the commission allowed benefits
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to all the claimants, and the referee who heard the matter
upon the employers' appeal affirmed this determination. The
employers then sought a writ of mandamus from the Dis. trict Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, to prevent
the commission from paying benefits to claimants. The District Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ and ordered
the commission not to pay the benefits pending determina·
tion of the matter on the merits. This court, however, issued
a peremptory writ of prohibition restraining the District
Court of Appeal from enforcing the writ of mandate or the
restraining order against the commission. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132
A.L.R. 715].) Meanwhile, the commission ordered the referee's decision set aside and set the matter, then pending before it on appeal, for hearing. Furthermore, pending a determination on the merits, it refused to allow payment of the
accrued benefits to claimants. Claimants' petition to this
court for a writ of mandamus to compel payment of these
benefits was denied. (Abellcira v. California Employment
Commission, S. F. No. 16585.) Subsequently the commission,
with two members absent and one dissenting, allowed benefits
to all claimants except those who were working on cargoes
when the strike was declared and were under instructions to
return for work on those cargoes on the following day, and
who refused to cross the ship clerks' picket lines. Even in
these cases benefits were allowed if the employer's agent did
not instruct the men to work or the foreman told them they
might as well return to the hiring hall. By stipUlation the
case was submitted on the record of the proceedings before
the commission with the reservation of the right to try the
question before the court whether the parties should have the
right to try the case de novo, but the question as to this right
was not argued.
[1] The commission and the claimants contend that the
employers have not exhausted their administrative remedies
and are therefore not entitled to the writ. They assert that
section 41.1 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1941,
p. 2535; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp., Act 8780d, § 41.1),
added in 1941 after the decision of this court in Bodinson
Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109
P.2d 935], supplies the remedy that the court there found
lacking and provides the employer with a new administrative
and legal remedy that adequately protects his rights. Section

41.1 requires the COmmISSIOn to furnish the employer with
annual itemized statements showing the charges and credits
to his account, the net balance of his reserve, and his contribution rate for the next succeeding rating period. It provides
that he may within a certain period protest any item shown
therein, and, .if the proceeding is determined against him,
bring an action against the commission to recover the amount
of contribution claimed as an overpayment after such determination, although no protest was :filed at the time of payment. Section 41.1, however, does not provide a remedy for
the illegal payment of benefits nor does the relief it affords
differ substantially from that provided by section 45.10 of the
act. The latter section provides for the payment of contributions under protest and allows the employer to bring an
action against the commission to recover contributions so
paid. Section 41.1 simply makes it unnecessary to file a protest as a condition to contesting items charged to the employer's account and suing for the recovery of allegedly excessive contributions, and provides for supplying him information upon which to base his contest. It, therefore, can no
more operate to deprive the court of power to review a decision of the commission awarding unemployment benefits
alleged to be in violation of the plain provisions of the act
than can the provision for court review in section 45.10.
(See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com.,
supra.)
[2] The eommission and claimants contend, however, that
the employer's only interest is in his merit rating, and that
section 41.1 affords an adequate remedy to contest char~es
to his account affecting that rating. Although section 41.1
provides for an administrative determination of the correctness of the charges and for recovery of overpayments, this
remedy, like that afforded by section 45.10, is distinct from
that provided by section 67 of the act to test the propriety of
the payment of benefits. Section 67 provides for the determination of the claimant's application for benefits and" any
employer whose reserve account may be affected by the payment of benefits to any individual formerly in his employ may
become an interested party to any proceeding under this
article. . . ." As a party to the proceedillg he may appeal
from the initial determination (Deering'S Gen. Laws, 1939
Supp., Act 8780d, § 67) or from the decision of the refereo
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(Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 72). The act
thus recognizes his adversary interest in preventing the illegal
payment of benefits and does not limit his remedy to a protest of charges that have been made to his account after the
disputed benefits have been paid. He is a party" beneficially
interested" in the administrative proceeding to determine the
award of benefits and retains this status for the purpose of
testing before a court of law the legality of the commission's
final decision. (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment
Com., supra, at pp. 330-331.)
[3] There is nothing in the statute to indicate that section
41.1 was intended to afford the employer an opportunity to
relitigate the propriety of the award of benefits. Since he
may raise objections to the award in proceedings under sections 67 and 72, the decision in such proceedings will finally
determine the propriety of the payments, thus precluding objections by him to charges based upon the claimants' ineligibility for benefits in later proceedings to which they are not
parties. The commission so interpreted its rule 41.1, which
was in effect before the adoption of section 41.1 and which
was phrased in substantially the same terms. (See Commission's Interpretative Bulletin, Commission form DE 1759.)
[4] Petitioners contend that the claimants are not entitled
to benefits on the ground that under section 56 ea) of the act
a claimant. is ineligible to receive them if he left his work because of a trade dispute, for the period during which he "continues out of work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute
is still in active progress in the establishment in which he
was employed." They contend that claimants' work was the
longshore work at the San Prancisco waterfront docks and
that under the rule of Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com., 17 Ca1.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935], they left their
work because of a trade dispute when they refused to perform it during the employers' dispute with the Ship Clerks'
Union.
In the Bodinson case the claimants were employed by the
Bodinson Manufacturing Company as machinists. On May
24, 1930, a strike was called by employees of the company
who were members of the Welders' Union, Local No. 130. The
. claimants refused to pass through the picket line established
by the welders at the employer's plant and contended that
they were entitled to benefit payments on the ground that
they had not left their work voluntarily but were prevented

MATSON TERMINALS, tNC. iI. CAL. ~MP. COM.
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by the picket lines from going to work. The court rejected
this contention: "If the picket line was maintained within
the limits permitted by law, as this one presumably was, no
physical compulsion was exerted to prevent co-respondents
from working. They were unemployed solely because, in accordance with their union principles, they did not choose to
work in a plant where certain of their fellow employees were
on strike. Their own consciences and faith in their union
principles dictated their action. This choice is one which
members of organized labor are frequently called upon to
make, and in the eyes of the law this kind of choice has never
been deemed involuntary. . . . In brief, disqualification
under the act depends upon the fact of voluntary action, and
not the motives which led to it. The Legislature did not seek
to interfere with union principles or practices. The act merely
sets up certain conditions as a prerequisite to the right to receive compensation, and declares that in certain situations .
the worker shall be ineligible to receive compensation. Fairly
interpreted, it was intended to disqualify those workers who
voluntarily leave their work because of a trade dispute. Corespondents in this proceeding in fact 'left their work because
ofa trade dispute' and are consequently ineligible to receive
.
benefit payments. "
The claimants in the present case refused to work for· the
same reason that the claimants in the Bodinson case refused
to work. They could have continued working at the same
docks, for the same employers, under the same dispatching
arrangement through the hiring hall as they had before the
ship clerks' strike, and would have done so but for that strike
and their unwillingness to cross the ship clerks' picket lines.
They worked as they had in the past until the clerks' strike
began and from then until the end of the strike refused to
do any work affected by the strike. When the strike was over
they returned to their work in the only way they could, by
reporting to the hiring hall, each accepting his share of the
work as it was assigned. The failure of the claimants, including those who were engaged on a work assignment at the time
the clerks' strike began, or who were working at that time at
docks unaffected by the strike, to work during the period for
which benefits are claimed was attributable solely to the
trade dispute between their employers and the Ship Clerks'
Union. Each of the many longshoremen who testified asserted
that he would not work during the clerks' strike behind the
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picket lines, and at the beginning of the strike responsible
union officials announced on behalf of the longshoremen their
refusal to work. It is immaterial, therefore, that some of the
iongshoremen were not instructed to work or were told to
return to the hiring hall. Their work was available to them
during the dispute as it was in the past, but pursuant to their
union principles they voluntarily refused it. They therefore
left their work within the meaning of the act because of a
trade dispute. This case accordingly falls within the rule of
the Bodinson case.
[5a] The commission and claimants contend that the Bodinson case is not controlling on the ground that when the
welders in that case went on strike and the claimants refused
to work,the relationship of employer and employee existed
between the claimants and the Bodinson Manufacturing Company, whereas in the present case, except for those longshoremen engaged upon a work assignment at the time the clerks'
strike was called, there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the claimants and any particular employer.
The commission's holding that such a relationship must exist
and that it did not exist in this case is based upon its interpretation of the provisions of section 56(a) determining the
duration of the disqualification. The section provides that a
claimant is ineligible for benefits while "he continues out of
work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is still in
active progress in the establishment in which he was employed" and thus contemplates that the "work" that claimant left was in an "establishment in which he was employed."
The commission contends that the word" employed" envisages
the "legal relationship of employer and employee" between
the claimant and a particular employer at the precise moment
that the trade dispute arises, and that a longshoreman in the
interim between work assignments is not "employed" for
the reason that he is under no contract of hire, but simply
has a right to be dispatched to a uew assignment in his proper
rotational order and, therefore, does not stand in the legal
relationship of employer and employee with any particular
employer. Under the commission's interpretation of section
56(a) the waterfront docks do not constitute an "establishment" since they were separately owned and controlled by
the various companies and were operated as separate enterprises.
Had the Legislature intended, however, that disqualifica-
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tion under section 56(a) should turn on whether the claimant
had ended a legal relationship of employer and employee at
the precise moment the trade dispute arose, it would hardly
have failed to speak in terms of that relationship or to provide
some standard by which its existence at that time could be
determined. It is unlikely that the Legislature would leave it
to the commission, a body of laymen, to deduce such an intention from the words "left his work" by way of a presumed
definition of the word "employed." Since there is no generally accepted test for determining at a particular moment
whether a person is "employed" it cannot be presumed that
the Legislature intended such a test when it used that word
in section 56(a). The test for such a determination may vary
according to the nature of the rights and liabilities involved.
Thus a person might be regarded as employed at a given
time when the question concerned the privileges and liabilities
arising from concerted action by employees (See Restatement:
Torts: § 775, et seq.) but would not be regarded as employed
if the question concerned the liability of the employer to
third persons (See Restatement: Agency: §§ 220, et seq.)
or the liability of the employer to the employee. (See the
Workmen's Compensation Act,· Lab. Code, §§ 3201-6002.)
The Labor Code provides that a worker's employment is
terminated by expiration of its appointed term (§ 2920), and
that he "is presumed to have been hired for such length of
time as the parties adopted for the estimation of wages" so
that a "hiring at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year;
a hiring at a daily rate, for one day." (§ 3001; see White v.
Oity of Alameda, 124 Cal. 95 [56 P. 795].) If the existence of
the "legal relation of employer and employee" were determined by these sections, workers who are employed on an
hourly or daily basis would be disqualified by a strike only if
they dropped their tools in the midst of work and walked off
the job. Under such a test the claimants in the Bodinson
case would have been entitled to benefit payments.
[6] The claimants agree that the foregoing provisions of
the Labor Code are not controlling and that a man may leave
his work within the meaning of the act "when he is not
actually engaged in work at the time that the trade dispute
starts." They contend, however, that registered longshoremen are not steadily employed, for they do not know from
one day to the next whether they will be employed, or if so; .
:I.0.24-2a
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by whom,~ whereas workers like those. in the Bodinson ca~e,
who are "regularly employed," or longshoremen on a work
assignment that is not finished, are on someone's payroll and
go home at night or for the week-end knowing when they are
to return to work, for what employer, and at what job. The
attempted distinction thus turns on the "probable expectancies" (See Jersey Oity Printing 00. v. Oassidy, 63 N.J.Eq.
759 [53 A. 230, 233]) in the two types of employment. Workers like those in the Bodinson case can reasonably expect at
the end of each day that their work will be available to them
the following day, just as the employer can reasonably expect them to be present to perform that work. The expectancy is based only on a probability, however, for each party
may terminate the relationship at will, whether because the
employer has no work to be performed, the employee is unable to perform it, or either is unwilling to continue the relationship. A registered longshoreman, however, has more than
an expectancy; his right to work is more secure than that of
the ordinary employee, for he has a legally enforceable right
whereby the group is entitled to first call on the work and
each longshoreman is entitled to his share. Although he does
not work regularly for the same employer at the same place
of business, a procedure forbidden by the contract between
the longshoremen's union and the employers' association, and
the intervals between work assignments may at times be
longer than those for a factory worker, because of the intermittent nature of longshore work, he works under an employment arrangement that assures him his proportionate share of
the work on the San Francisco waterfront. He is not permitted to look for work witn the indIvidual members' of the
employers' association but is dispatched to the various docks
where his services are required, in his turn in the manner
described. Under the arrangement provided by the contract
the longshore work of the port is his work. If there is work
to be done the employers cannot refuse it to him. The interval
between work assignments is a normal incident of his employment. The longshore work that each claimant regularly
pe:r;formed for the val'ous members of the employers' association, and to which he had an exclusive right was "his work"
within the meaning of section 56 (a). That work cannot be
taken from him except by joint action of his union and the
employers' association acting through the Joint Labor Rela-
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tions Committee. It was this work that claimants left when
they refused to perform it during the ship clerks' strike.
[7] The commission's interpretation of "establishment"
as each place of business of each employer, however apt it may
be generally, does not fit the facts in the present case. The
longshoremen's work and its locale are governed by contract.
One of the objects of the contract was the abolition of the
system that normally prevailed when some longshoremen
worked regularly for one employer while others had only occasional work. Under the contract all registered longshoremen are assigned through the hiring hall to all the work of
all the employers. As applied to these facts the term "establishment" as used in section 56(a) means the place of employment, namely, the various docks covered by the contract,
where the longshoremen customarily work. This was the area
covered by the ship clerks' strike. The disqualification of the
claimants therefore continued for the period covered by th.at
strike. [5b] That the Legislature did not intend that the
payment or withholding of benefits should turn on nice distinctions in the definition of words like "employed" and
"establishment" is evident from section 1 of the act: "As a
guide to the interpretation and application of this act the
public policy of this State is declared as follows: . . . The
Legislature therefore declares that in its considered judgment
the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the
State require the enactment of this measure under the police
power of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of funds
to be used for a system of unemployment insurance providing
benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their
own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum." The act establishes
a policy of neutrality in trade disputes by provisions that
the payment or withholding of benefits should not be used to
aid either party to a trade dispute. Thus the provision disqualifying a worker who leaves his work because of a trade
dispute § 56 (a) is balanced by the provision that other unemployed workers shall not be required to fill the vacated jobs
or lose their right to unemployment insurance benefits.
(§ 13 (b) (1).) The payment of benefits to a claimant who
leaves his work because of a trade dispute would conflict with
this policy just as would the withholding of payments because
a claimant refused to become a strikebreaker.
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As all the claimants in this case left their work because of
a trade dispute, they are disqualified under section 56 (a)
from receiving benefits for unemployment during the period
of the dispute.
[8] There remains for consideration the question whether
the employees, though not entitled to an award of unemployment benefits under the act, should nevertheless receive them
because an initial award was affirmed by the referee. Section 67 of the act provides that "If a referee affirms an
initial determination allowing benefits, such benefits shall be
paid regardless of any appeal that thereafter may be taken."
The interveners contend that under this provision they are
entitled to receive payments from the time of the double
affirmance, whether the award was right or wrong. The
petitioners contend that, whatever the rights of the employees before the final determination herein, no payments
can now be made under section 67 if it is finally decided
that the employees are ineligible therefor. The answer to
this question cannot be found in either the language of the
act, or any decision to which our attention has been called;
it must; therefore, be arrived at by a consideration of the
legislative purpose in enacting section 67, and of the general
law applicable to mistaken or unauthorized payment of nioney.
It was conclusively decided in Abelleira v. District Court
of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 298 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715],
that section 67 is a valid provision. The court there declared
that the purpose of the provision was to provide prompt payments to alleviate the distress of unemployment,whatever
the issues of law or fact that might be involved in any appeal
from or review of the referee's decision. Under that decision,
employees are entitled to payments immediately upon the referee's affirmance of the initial detcrmination, even though
an appeal to the commission itself is pending, or a proceeding in review, proper or improper, is pending before a court.
The court also took occasion to indicate the necessity and
reasonableness of such a proviSion, noting the likelihood that
for the most part the awards will be correct, and that to permit them to be withheld for months or years by appeals and
court proceedings would defeat the objects of the statute.
It might be concluded that the payments in the instant
case, which should have been made upon the referee's affirm-

ance but were not, should be made without further delay. In
this case, however, there are two factors, not present in the
Abelleira case: The commission itself vacated and set aside
the decision of the referee and transferred the matter to itself
for determination, and this court has now decided finally
that the employees were not entitled to the payments under
the terms of the act.
A consideration of the first factor mU8t start with the prop-,
osition that the commission has the power to vacate a decision
of the referee. Section 72 provides: "Any party to a decision
by a referee may appeal to the commission from such decision. The commission may on its own motion affirm, modify,
or set aside any decision of a referee on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case, or direct the taking
of additional evidence. The commission may 'remove to itself
or transfer to another referee the proceedings on' any claim
pending. before a referee." This section separately provides
that a party may appeal to the commission alid that the commission may act on its own motion. There is nothing to
indicate that the commission may not act of its own motion
though an appeal is pending. Once it has vacated the decision
of the referee, section 67 ceases to be applicable, for the
vacated decision of the referee is a nullity and cannot operate
as the second affirmance of the award. It is consonant with
the spirit of the statute that the commission should be permitted to administer the act without interference by the
courts in its intermediate determinations. Since the commission itself acts in a supervisory capacity in reviewing the
referee's determination, and may deliberate at some length
in its consideration of any appeal to it; there is good reason
to deny a stay, and to require payments to be made, pending
decision on that appeal. There is, however, the possibility
of a serious evil in this normal procedure, namely, that large
groups of claimants could claim and obtain substantial sums
in violation of the terms and objects of the statute. The act
could not long survive if its purposes were thus distorted,
and it is essential, in an unusual situation involving serious
questions of law and large amounts of money, that the commission step in and take over the case from the referee for
its own consideration. The commission has the responsibility
of administering the funds in accord with the statute, and
to do so it must exercise reasonable supervision over its ref-
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erees. It is for the commISSIOn to determine what cases are
of enough importance to justify a departure from the ordinary procedure of appeal. It, therefore, follows that, although
payments should start immediately upon the referee's affirmance, they can be stopped at any time the commission chooses
to exercise this extraordinary power of vacating the referee's
decision, and can be prevented entirely if the commission acts
immediately to vacate the decision. The commission's power
to limit the payment of benefits must be considered in the
light of where the alternative course would lead. If the
interpretation and administration of the act were left to the
referees· instead of to the commission, any referee would have
unrestricted power to distinguish, interpret or even disregard in later cases a controlling decision of the commission
or the courts laid down as a precedent to govern future action.
Despite any disciplinary action that might be taken against
the referee, the commission would be powerless to stop illegal
payments until an appeal was filed, brought to a hearing, and
decided.
The second factor that distinguishes this case from the
Abelleira case is the final determination by this court that
the awards were unauthorized. If the commission's action
in vacating the referee's decision is disregarded, there results
the paradox that the claimants should receive payments under
section 67, even though they are not entitled under the act
to any payments. The claimants contend that the silence
of the Legislature in this regard indicates an intention that
the payments be made, rightly or wr011gly. Under this interpretation, the detailed substantive provisions of the statute
would be subordinated to the procedural provisions of section 67, and the award would be based, not on compliance
with the terms of the act, but on a successful argument to a
referee. Those who convince Referee A would be entitled to
unemployment benefits; those who, in a similar situation, fail
to convince Referee B would not be entitled to benefits. A
legal right to public moneys cannot be based on such a dubious combination of an administrative officer's error and an
obscurely worded statutory provision. The right to have payments begin upon a provisional determination of their correctness in no way establishes a right to payments once their
impropriety is finally determined. (Of. Baldwin v. Scott
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Oounty Milling 00., 307 U.S. 478 [59 S.Ct. 943, 83 L.Ed.
1409] .)
[9] In accord with the statute as interpreted in the Abelleira case, payments must be made pursuant to the referee's
determination. If subsequently, however, by a decision of the
commission on appeal or by a court on review, the payments
are found to be unauthorized and illegal, section 67 does not
make them valid. That section merely prevents a stay i it
does not create a substantive right. Since the provision against
stay does not create any rights in conflict with the substantive provisions of the statute, there is no ground upon which
the illegal awards can be paid.
It may be added that this decision is in complete accord
with the holding in the Abelleira case, supra, that there is no
justification for any interference by the courts with the commission's proceedings, before its final decision, and that prohibition will lie to prevent it. It follows also from the decision
herein that the proper procedure to prevent serious violation
of the conditions governing payment of benefits is to seek the
intervention of the commission itself to vacate the referee's
determination. Otherwise there can be no stay of enforcement
of the award, and mandamus may be sought to compel its
payment.
Let a peremptory writ issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the employees here
involved were entitled to the payment of unemployment insurance benefits upon the affirmance of the allowance of such
benefits to them by the referee pursuant to the provisions
of section 67 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act.
The holding of the majority opinion to the contrary in effect
nullifies the provisions of section 67 of said act which were
designed "to carry out the poLicy declared in section 1 of
alleviating the evils of unemployment, as part of a national
plan of social security in which federal and state legislation
is coupled," and overrules the case of Abelleira v. District
Oourt of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715]
although it purports to rely upon this case in support of its
conclusion. The majority opinion states: "In accord with
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the statute as interpreted in the Abelleira case, payments must
be made pursuant to the referee's determination. If subsequently, however, by a decision of the commission on appeal,
or by a court on review, the payments are found to be unauthorized and illegal, section 67 does not make them valid.
That section merely prevents a stay; it does not create a
substantive right. Since the provision against stay does not
create any rights in conflict with the substantive provisions
of the statute, there is no ground upon which the illegal
awards can be paid. H
Section 67 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act,
after providing for a hearing and initial determination of a
claim for benefits and an appeal therefrom reads: "If 8.
referee affirms an initial determination allowing benefits,
such benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which
may thereafter be taken, but if such determination is finally
reversed no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid as to each such determination so reversed."
The foregoing provision was interpreted by this court in
the Abelleira case, and the holding in the case at bar is squarely contrary to the reasoning tnerein. It is said in the Abelleira case at page 298:
, , This [referring to the provision in section 67] is one of
the most significant statements in the act. In substance it
provides that when the initial determination has been reviewed and approved by the intermediate appellate authority
(the referee), no further delay in payment shall be permitted
even though the issues may be still further considered in a
subsequent appeal. It was designed to carry out the policy
declared in section 1 of alZeviating the evils of unemployment,
as part of a national plan of social security in which federal
and state legislation is coupled. (Sec. 2.) The very essence
of the act is its provisio-n for the prompt payment of benefits
to those unemployed. (See 88 Univ.Pa.L.Rev. 137, 139.) Any
substantial d,e.la!y would defeat this purpose and would bring
back the very eiJil sought to be avoided. The legislature, recognizing the importance on the one hand of avoiding improvident payments without due consideration of the right thereto,
and the danger on the other hand of withholding the payments for long periods through the slow processes of appeal to
the commission and perhaps eventually to the courts, took a
.middle course. It provided for a preliminary appeal or
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review of the first determination where payments were
ordered. This appeal, ordinarily decided in a short period
of time, carries with it a stay. But when this second decision has also been made in favor of the applicants, the benefits
begin, with protection, as already noted, for the employer
in the event of later reversal. . . . But in truth there
is nothing unusual in the provision, which is in force in
some thirty-six of the states. The legislature has concluded
on the basis of normal experience that the large majority
of the administrative orders will be proper, and that to permit these justifiable and necessary payments to be postponed
for long periods would defeat the objectives of the act. • . .
"The foregoing cases demonstrate the weakness of the
argument that because a commission may make an occasional error in ordering some payment out of a public or
semi-public fund, the courts must have the power to stay
any and all payments during the lengthy period of judicial
review. The legislature has concluded that it is wiser to
have a system of unemployment compensation operating
with a possible small percentage of error, than to have a
system not operating at all. The legislative power to make
such provision is unquestioned; the statutory language cannot be misunderstood; and for the courts that is the end of
the matter." (Italics added.) It is to be noted that great
stress is laid upon the necessity of prompt payment and
that the payments shall continue during appeal, otherwise
the whole purpose of the act will be frustrated; that the Legislature chose to accept the risk of annullment of the order
for payment of benefits believing that the probabilities were
such that the great majority of the. claims would be decided
correctly.
The majority opinion states that it agrees with the Abelleira case, and then proceeds to hold that benefits need not be
paid upon the affirmance of an allowance by a. referee. On
the contrary, the Abelleira case held that the Legislature
chose to run the risk of the few instances in which an allowance of benefits, affirmed by a referee, would be found
erroneous, and that, therefore, payment should be made upon
such affirmance. The wording of the statute itself admits
of but one interpretation. It states that the benefits. shall be
paid regardless of any appeal. Certainly the appeal em·
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braces a decision on appeal. The sole requirement is that
the initial allowance of the claim for benefits be affirmed by
the referee. There is no requirement that it be correct or
found to be correct on appeal, and, as pointed out in the
.Abelleira case, the Legislature assumed the risk of the relatively few cases which would be incorrectly decided.
The conclusion reached in the majority opinion in support
of its position that benefits need not be paid upon the af"
firmance of an allowance by a referee is based upon the
obviously unsound premise that "that section (67) merely
prevents a stay; it does not create a substantive right. Since
the provision against stay does not create any rights in con:fl.ict with the substantive provisions of the statute, there is
no ground upon which the illegal awards can be paid." No
authority is cited for the foregoing statement and I doubt,
if any can be found. It cannot be denied that the above,
quoted provision of section 67 of the Unemployment Insurance Act creates a right to receive benefits undei' said act
"if a referee affirms an initial determination allowing benefits. " In other words, the act provides that upon such
affirmance, "benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal
which may thereafter be taken." To say that such a provision does not create a substa.ntive right, is to disregard the
clear meaning of the plain language there used. Can it be:
said that the above quoted provision of section 67 does not
create a right to receive benefits? The answer is obvious,
that it does create such right. Can it be said that such right
is not a substantive right Y The answer to this question is,
also obvious that such right is a substantive right. This
must be so if the Unemployment Insurance Act creates anything in the nature of a substantive right in favor of those,
unemployed.
A substantive right is contrasted with a remedial right.
It is said in Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed.), page 1672,
that substantive law is:
"That part of the law which the courts are established to
administer, as opposed to the rules according to which the
substantive law itself is administered. That part of the law
which creates, defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rig-hts or obtaining redress for their invasion.' ~
Here the act expressly and unconditionally gives a i-ight--,
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the right to receive payment of the benefits. It is not a
remedy, method, or rule by which a right is acquired. It is
the right itself. No steps are required to obtain it. It is a
granted right.
The payment of the benefit after affirmance by the referee
is not by the terms of the statute wholly without limitation.
Section 67 expressly provides that the employer's accountl
shall not be charged if the allowance of the claim is finally
reversed on appeal. Hence, the Legislature did consi,dcr
the question of what, if any, conditions should be imposed
upon .or result from the payment of benefits even though an
appeal was taken. It must be presumed that that condition
was the sole one intended by the Legislature. If it had intended others it would have so stated. Its failure to do so
clearly evinces an intent that it did not so intend. The rule
of statutory construction stated in In re De Neef, 42 Cal.App.
2d 691, 694 [109 P.2d741], is applicable:
',' Thus we are confronted with two well known rules of
statutory construction-that when the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous it does not permit judicial interpretation or construction; and that, when the statute itself
specifies its exceptions, no other may be added under the
guise of judicial construction." (Italics added.) And in
Perkins v. Thornburgh, 10 Cal. 189, 191:
"It will be seen that the Code itself states the effect of
the verdict, if in favor of the claimant. It also states the
effect of the verdict, if against the cillimant, as to costs.
When a statute assumes to specify the effects of a certain
provision, we must presume that all the effects intended by
the law-maker are stated. (Lee v. Evans, 8 Cal.Rep., 424;
Bird v. Dennison, 7 Cal.Rep. [297], 307; Melony v. Whitman,
[People v. Whitman] page 38 of this volume.)" (Italics
added.) (See also Duncan v. Superior Oourt, 104 Cal.App.
218 [285 P. 732].
, Concerning the question of whether or not, in the instant
'case, the employees should be entitled to the benefits which
should have been paid but were not prior to the reversal on
.appeal there are several persuasive arguments why the em'ployees should be entitled thereto. First, the purpose of the
act, that is, to have prompt payments regardless of an appeal will be thwarted if they alte not so made. The officinls
administering the act will be wholly free at their whim or
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caprice to defeat that purpose by merely failing to make the
payments or by the action of the commission in setting aside
the referee's affirmance of the initial allowance. Certainly
the Legislature did not intend that the main, and aa expressed
in the Abelleira case, the most important part of the act
should rest upon such a precarious basis. Second, the benefits must be paid "regardless of any appeal." That phrase
clearly embraces the decision on appeal. Paraphrasing, it
would read that the benefits are payable regardless of a reversal on appeal. In other words there was an absolute
obligation to pay, and the Legislature chose to assume the
risk of error by the referee. (Abelleira v. District Court of
Appeal, su-pra.) Third, the above discussed rule of statutory construction applies, namely, that the only limitation
attached to the payment was in respect to the employer's
account. The expression of that condition eliminates others
and others may not be added by judicial construction.
From what I have said in the foregoing opinion, it follows
that the employees here involved were entitled to unemploy~
ment insurance benefits from the date of the affirmance of
the award in their favor by the referee and that such benefits should be paid until the final determination by this court
that they were not entitled thereto.
Schauer, J., concurred.
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Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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AMERICAN-HAWAIIAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY (n
Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents;
JAMES DUGGAR et al., Interveners and Respondents.
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[1] See 11 Oa1.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "UnemployMcK. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Relief.
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against employers operating terminal facilities for transporting freight by water and who refused to work for them during
the strike left their work because of a trade dispute within
Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a) (Stats. 1935, ch. 352;
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 878Od), and were precluded by that
section from receiving benefit payments for unemployment
during the strike, although at the beginning of the strike they
were either not working on any assignment or were working
for employers not subject to the strike.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the C81ifornia Employment Commission to vacate an order awarding benefit
payments and to refrain from charging petitioners' accounts
,with such payments. Writ granted.
Brobeck, Phlcger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison for
,Petitioners.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Maurice P. McCaffrey, Glenn V. Walls, Ralph R. Planteen, Charles
P. Scully, Forrest M. Hill, Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis &
Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein, Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard Gladstein for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 10, 1939, the Ship Clerks'
Union, Local 1-34 of the International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union, called a strike effective at 6:00 p. m.
on that day against employers who were members of the Dockcheckers Employers' Association of 'San Francisco, because
they could not agree upon the renewal terms of collective bar'gaining agreements that had expired on September 30, 1939.
'The strike continued until January 3, 1940, when it waa termi.
nated by agreement of the parties. The Dock-Checkers' Employers' Association, noW part of the Waterfront Employers'
Association of San Francisco, represented its members, who
. operate terminal facilities for freight transported by water
to and from ports on San Francisco Bay, in their collective
bargaining with the Ship Clerks' Union. The employment
arrangement, similar to that for the longshoremen, was established under a contract executed on March 30, 1937, between
the checkers' union and the employers' association. By agree-

